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Abstract 
Does candidate religion influence vote choice? And if so, under what conditions does religion 
matter? Previous research has found that minority candidates can receive either an electoral 
advantage from members of their in-group and/or an electoral penalty from members of 
their out-group. However, the social mechanisms that underpin these candidate effects are 
not well understood. Some variant of social identity theory or empowerment theory is 
usually proffered to explain the ethnic advantage; whereas some variant of racial/religious 
discrimination is usually employed to explain the ethnic penalty. Both mechanisms imply an 
expressive calculus (identity / prejudice) and more instrumental mechanisms are rarely 
explored. Moreover, this research has been largely limited to studies of minorities in the 
advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe and North America. In this contribution 
we provide the first systematic analysis of the impact of candidate religion on voting 
behavior in an ethnically divided democracy: Uttar Pradesh, North India. The results from a 
series of conditional logit models shows that Muslims are indeed more likely to vote for 
Muslim candidates, but only when those candidates have a realistic chance of winning – 
there is thus a strong strategic element to their vote calculus. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that Hindus discriminate against Muslim candidates, or that parties face an electoral penalty 
for fielding a Muslim candidate. 
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Introduction 
The descriptive representation of ethnic and religious minorities is a major issue in the study 
of ethnic minority disadvantage in politics (Fieldhouse and Sobelewska 2013). Visible ethnic 
minorities tend to be notably under-represented in many democratically elected bodies 
around the world (Kymlicka 1995, Bird 2005). Explanations for this relatively low level of 
representation have tended to focus on supply and demand side factors (Norris et al. 1992). 
On the supply side, minorities may be discriminated against in the selection process and 
face obstacles to becoming candidates in the first place. On the demand side, minorities 
may be discriminated against by voters, leaving their success limited to just a few areas with 
large minority populations. These demand side dynamics may in turn influence candidate 
selection strategy, and if parties think that minority candidates are discriminated against by 
voters then they may be less likely to offer them tickets, compounding the problem of 
minority under-representation. The issue of whether majority voters discriminate against 
minority candidates - or indeed whether minority voters are more likely to vote for minority 
candidates - is thus of critical importance to the debate surrounding the political 
representation of ethnic minorities.   
In order to explore these demand side dynamics, over the last few years a growing 
body of research has examined the impact of candidate ethnicity and religion on voters. A 
number of studies show that visible minorities are more likely to vote for members of their 
own ethnic or racial group in the US (e.g. Wolfinger 1965, Bobo and Gilliam 1990, Collet 
2005, Barreto 2007,  Philpot and Walton 2007, McConnaughy et al 2010) and in several 
North European countries (e.g. Teney 2010, Berg and Bjoklund 2011). By contrast, a number 
of studies have also shown that minority candidates are discriminated against by majority 
voters in both the US (e.g. Terkildsen 1993) and the UK (Stegmaier et al. 2013, Fisher et al 
2014). There is thus growing evidence that candidate ethnicity matters, and that minority 
candidates can receive either an electoral advantage from members of their in-group and/or 
an electoral penalty from members of their out-group.  
Broadly speaking the extant literature suggests a variety of both expressive and 
instrumental motivations. Voters may support a candidate from their own religion because 
they identify with that candidate or because they anticipate some benefit from having that 
candidate in office. In order to try and distinguish between these two broad mechanisms we 
consider the strategic incentives that might moderate the strength of any candidate 
ethnicity effects.  If voters support co-ethnic candidates for purely (or mainly) expressive 
reasons, then simply the presence of a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot should be enough 
to garner support from co-ethnic voters. However, if voters support a co-ethnic candidate 
for strategic reasons, then in Downsian terms the decision of whether to support a co-ethnic 
candidate may be off-set by the voter’s calculation of how likely it is that the candidate in 
question will win. Despite the importance of political competition in many accounts of 
ethnic voting (Eifert et al 2012) this line of argument has not been explored with reference 
to studies on candidate ethnicity effects. Moreover, those candidate studies which do exist 
have largely been based on the United States and Western Europe. To date there has been 
very little comparative research on the effects of candidate ethnicity or religion on voting 
behaviour more generally, and none in developing democracies where ethnicity is often a 
salient political marker. 
In this contribution we examine the impact of candidate religion on voting behavior 
in Uttar Pradesh, North India and whether this relationship is moderated by the structure of 
political competition and the structure of social demography.Given the bitter communal 
conflicts between Hindus and Muslims that have plagued the state, Uttar Pradesh 
represents an important test case to examine whether candidate’s religion is a bar to 
political representation. Do Hindu voters discriminate against Muslim candidates?  
Conversely, do Muslims vote for Muslim candidates? To what extent does candidate religion 
influence voting behavior and how is this moderated by the political and social context?  
In answering these questions we not only provide the first direct test of the impact 
of candidate religion on voters in India, but we also contribute to an emerging literature on 
the impact of candidate trait on voters more generally, and broaden the scope of inquiry to 
investigate the impact of candidate ethnicity in a different social context: that of an 
ethnically divided democracy. In this article we show that candidate religion does matter in 
the Indian context, and that Muslims behave in a classic Downsian fashion. We show that 
Muslims are indeed more likely to vote for Muslim candidates, but only when those 
candidates have a realistic chance of winning – there is thus a strong strategic element to 
their vote calculus. Moreover, there is no evidence that Hindus discriminate against Muslim 
candidates, or that parties do not face an electoral penalty for fielding a Muslim candidate. 
The article proceeds as follows. First we review the relevant literature that has 
addressed issues related to the ethnicity of candidates and elaborate our key hypotheses. 
Second we discuss the motivation for testing our argument on the Indian case. We then 
present the results from a series of conditional logit models, using data from an original 
database on candidates and voters in Uttar Pradesh, India. Finally, we conclude by 
presenting the implications of our findings and by suggesting avenues for further research. 
Why candidate’s religion matters?  
There is now a growing body of work that shows, at least as far as voters are concerned, 
descriptive – or social representation matters, and all else being equal, people with a given 
social characteristic prefer candidates or leaders who share that characteristic: research in 
other contexts has shown that women are more likely than men to vote for female 
candidates in the US (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Bendyna and Lake 1994; Cook 1994; 
Huddy 1994; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Dolan 1998); working class voters are more likely to 
vote for working class candidates in the UK (Heath 2013); black people are more likely than 
white people to vote for black candidates and Latinos are more likely to support Latino 
candidates in the US (Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, and Nitz 1995; Tate 1993; Terkildsen 
1993).  
One explanation for these findings is that the public use the social background of 
politicians to make judgments about what sort of policies they will pursue if elected to 
office. According to Popkin (1991: 63) "demographic facts provide a low-information 
shortcut to estimating a candidate's policy preferences... characteristics such as a 
candidate's race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and local ties are important cues because the 
voter observes the relationship between these traits and real-life behavior as part of his 
daily experience". Similarly, Blais, Brady, and Crete (1992: 169) argue that "it is entirely 
reasonable to ask how much like oneself the potential agent is. The more an agent 
resembles oneself the more he or she might be expected reflexively to understand and act 
on one's own interests ... we might reasonably prefer leaders who embody our own 
demographic characteristics". More generally, Cutler (2012) argues that sociodemographic 
dissimilarity with a political figure (e.g., party leader) tends to decrease a voter's expected 
utility from the election of that person. 
With respect to ethnic or racial politics in particular, these ideas have been applied 
to the study of candidate traits in the US. McConnaughy et al (2010) contend that the 
presence of a Latino on the ballot functions as a cue or informational short-cut that helps 
Latinos to judge if a candidate will be likely to represent the interests of their ethnic group. 
“That is, ethnic heritage can communicate a candidate’s likely positions and commitments 
with regard to issues that Latinos believe affect the ethnic group” (ibid: 3). Along similar 
lines, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) argue that the presence of minority elected officials sends a 
contextual cue to minority citizens that the benefits of voting outweigh the costs of not 
voting (see also Bareto, 2007).  
This body of work implies that voters tend to attach greater expected utility from 
socially similar rather than dissimilar candidates. If this candidate utility differential exceeds 
the party differential then voters may be prepared to compromise on their preferred party if 
the candidate from another party is socially similar. However, the strategic incentives that 
may influence this decision have rarely been explored. The implicit assumption is that voters 
will favour candidate over party. But if voters are prepared to abandon their favoured party 
for a socially similar candidate that stands no chance of winning, then this suggests that 
their motivation for doing so may not be quite as instrumental as is often presented. 
However, if voters behave in a strategic fashion they will not only take into consideration 
the marginal utility of having a socially similar candidate elected, they will also consider the 
probability of success for that candidate. Ethnic minorities may therefore discount the 
ethnicity or religion of uncompetitive candidates and be less inclined to compromise on 
their preferred party. By contrast, if minorities vote for purely expressive reasons or simply 
because they have been mobilised by a co-ethnic candidate then they may vote along ethnic 
lines, regardless of the competitiveness of the candidate. For similar reasons majority voters 
may be more likely to discriminate against minority candidates when two or more 
candidates are relatively evenly placed. In this sense candidate religion or ethnicity can act 
as a tie-break to separate parties that have a realistic chance of winning.  
Hypotheses 
In order to explore these strategic incentives we test two main hypotheses. In particular we 
consider the social and political incentives for different groups to vote for (or against) a 
Muslim candidate. Firstly, we examine whether the impact of candidate religion on vote 
varies by Muslim population density. For example, Chandra (2009) emphasises the strategic 
importance of ethnic demography for structuring voter expectations about likely electoral 
outcomes. Chandra suggests that voters count heads from each ethnic group in their 
constituency, from which they can guess the relative position of each party if each ethnic 
group votes along ethnic lines. Voters will use this information, and only vote along ethnic 
lines if they think their own party or candidate will win. Muslims may be more likely to vote 
for Muslim candidates in constituencies with large Muslim populations. Anecdotal evidence 
supports this claim. For instance, Rudolph and Rudolph argue that, “where Muslims feel 
themselves a distinct and vulnerable minority, they avoid antagonizing or seek the 
protection of mainstream parties by voting as the general electorate does; they support the 
likely winner and governing party to be. In constituencies with high proportions of Muslims, 
however, Muslims tend to vote for Muslim candidates.” Thus, if Muslims ‘count heads’ then 
they may be more likely to vote for a Muslim candidate when Muslims represent a large 
part of the electorate, and they reason a Muslim candidate stands a good chance of 
winning.  
By contrast, according to the ethnic threat hypothesis Hindus may be more likely to 
discriminate against Muslims in high density Muslim areas. This hypothesis has received 
empirical support in the USA, where a number of studies have found that racial diversity 
leads to interracial competition for scarce resources and political power (Blalock 1967), 
causing whites to feel threatened by large black populations. Motivated by this threat, 
whites will then provide greater support for racially conservative candidates and public 
policies (e.g., Black and Black 1987; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Huckfeldt and 
Kohfeld 1989; Radcliff and Saiz 1995; Wright 1977). In addition a number of studies have 
examined the link between racial composition and black representation in the Senate and 
Congress and find that having larger black populations negatively affects the representation 
of black interests (Avery and Fine 2012).  
This ‘ethnic threat’ hypothesis suggests that more diverse areas may lead Hindus to 
become more hostile to Muslims and so less likely to vote for Muslim candidates. According 
to this hypothesis larger Muslim populations cause Hindus to feel threatened by potential 
communal competition over social, economic, and political resources. Subsequently, Hindus 
will favour Hindu candidates who stand up for their interests. Thus, in constituencies with a 
high Muslim population Hindus may be more likely to discriminate against Muslim 
candidates.  
Lastly, the political incentives hypothesis contends that Muslims will be more likely 
to vote for a Muslim candidate when that candidate stands a realistic chance of winning. If 
Muslims behave in a strategic fashion they will not only take into consideration the marginal 
utility of having a Muslim candidate elected, they will also consider the probability of 
success. They may therefore discount the religion of uncompetitive candidates and be less 
inclined to compromise on their preferred party. By contrast, if Muslims vote for purely 
expressive reasons or simply because they have been mobilised by a Muslim candidate then 
they may vote along communal lines, regardless of the competitiveness of the candidate. 
For similar reasons Hindus may be more likely to discriminate against Muslims when two or 
more candidates are relatively evenly placed. In this sense candidate religion can act as a 
tie-break to separate parties that have a realistic chance of winning.  
The Political Representation of Muslims in India 
Uttar Pradesh represents a particularly instructive case study to test these hypotheses. 
Muslims constitute 18% of the population in Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest state, and 13% of 
the population nationally. Muslims have historically been under-represented in elected 
office at both the national and the state level in India (Ansari 2006, Jaffrelot and Kumar 
2009, Jensenius 2013). For example, Ansari (2006, p. 64) shows between 1952 and 2004 
Muslims held about 4% of the seats in the Indian Parliament after the 1952 election, which 
increased to about 9% in the 1980 elections and then declined somewhat to 5-7% in the 
elections between the mid-1980s and 2004. Ansari (2006) concludes that Muslims have 
been consistently under-represented and that parties’ unwillingness to nominate Muslim 
candidates is one of the main reasons for this under-representation (see also Jensenius 
2013). 
Muslims are also among the most economically disadvantaged groups in India. A 
recent government report, set up to investigate the social, economic and educational status 
of Muslims in India identified "deficits and deprivation" in practically all dimensions of 
development (Sachar, 2006: 237), including literacy, access to education, employment in the 
government sector, and access to credit and loans. The situation was found to be 
‘particularly grave’ in States with large Muslim populations, such as Uttar Pradesh. 
Moreover, the report found that in addition to the 'development deficit', the perception 
among Muslims that they are discriminated against and excluded is widespread, which 
exacerbates the problem. Uttar Pradesh has a long history of communal violence between 
Hindus and Muslims (Nandy et al. 1995; Van der Veer 1994). According to the Sachar report 
(2006: 13) Muslims still fear for their safety and security and there is an underlying feeling of 
injustice towards the compensation to riot victims, with a perception of government 
discrimination against their claims. These issues raise the question of whether Muslims are 
also at a disadvantage in the electoral arena and if Muslim candidates face discrimination at 
the ballot box. 
In addition to these factors that may encourage Hindus to discriminate against 
Muslim candidates, there are also a number of reasons to believe that Muslims may be more  
likely to vote for Muslim candidates. Muslim conceptions of political representation have 
often tended to emphasize the communal group as the basic unit of representation and 
focus of loyalty. According to Shaikh (1986: 541) the abiding Islamic concern with communal 
solidarity has meant that Muslims tend, more often than not, to evaluate their situation in 
primarily communal terms. This suggests that the notion of descriptive representation may 
be particularly salient for Muslim voters. Accordingly, Muslim politicians may be thought to 
‘better represent’ Muslims than Hindus do. Given the context of communal clashes and 
ethnic violence in India, and the role that political elites have played in orchestrating such 
violence, Muslims may well feel that it is important for their own security to have Muslim 
politicians in office.  Moreover, they may feel that Muslim representatives are more likely to 
advance issues of conventional Muslim concern, such as the protection of Urdu and Muslim 
Personal Law.  
In addition to these general issues of discrimination and representation there are a 
number of reasons for suspecting that candidate traits may be relatively important in the 
Indian context, and in UP in particular. Firstly, although India uses a plurality electoral 
system which provides less of an incentive to vote specifically for candidates than open-list 
PR systems, the party system is characterised by very low levels of party cohesion where 
legislators frequently move between parties. Candidate traits and ideology are thus often 
thought to be important relative to party labels (Ziegfeld 2014), which may increase the 
impact of candidate traits  - specifically religion - on the vote. Secondly, religion is a major 
source of electoral support (Heath 1999, Heath and Yadav 2009) and elections are often 
described as ‘ethnic headcounts,’ (Chandra 2004) where people vote for parties which 
contain members of their ethnic community rather than by comparing policy platforms.  
Thirdly, Uttar Pradesh is characterized by multiparty competition, with three secular parties 
that compete with each other to gain Muslim votes. The principle competition in the state 
involves the SP (Samajwadi Party: Socialist Party) which gets strong support among Yadavs, 
traditionally a low- to middle-ranking cluster of agricultural-pastoral castes (Michelutti 
2008); the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party: Majority People’s Party) which gets strong support 
among the Jatavs and other Dalit (former untouchable) communities (Chandra 2004); the 
BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party: Indian People’s Party), a Hindu nationalist party, which gets 
strong support among the Hindu Upper Castes (Heath 1999), and Congress, which is the 
only party to lack a distinctive social base (Heath and Yadav 1999). Muslims are the only 
major ethnic group in the state who do not have a distinct political party to represent their 
interests – and partly for this reason they may be inclined to switch their support between 
the three secular parties (SP, BSP, Congress) according the religion of the candidate. 
Table 1: Religion of party candidates (2012 State Election) 
From Table 1 we can see that the two main parties, the BSP and SP, gave a similar number 
of tickets to Muslims (about 1 in 5) in the 2012 State election. This is considerably more than 
the Congress managed (just 1 in 17) and the BJP put forward only a solitary Muslim 
candidate.  On average Muslims comprised 30% of the electorate in seats where at least one 
of the major parties put forward a Muslim candidate, compared to just 12% of the 
electorate in seats where no parties put forward a Muslim candidate.1  This strategy of 
                                                          
1
 The overall constituency mean for the size of the Muslim population is 18.5% (st. dev 12.5). The constituency 
mean of the Muslim population in places where a given party put forward a Muslim candidate is 28.4% (st. dev 
13.3) for the BSP; 30.3% (st.dev 14.2) for the SP; and 29.6% (14.1) for the INC, respectively. The variation in the 
candidate selection is informed at least partly by the assumption that Muslims are more 
likely to vote for Muslim candidates. But is this really the case? And is there any adverse 
effect? Are Hindus less likely to vote for a Muslim? And if so, is this off-set or even over-
taken by any potential gains from the increased support of Muslim voters?  
Data 
To test the hypotheses we link data on candidates religious background and constituency 
characteristics to cross-sectional survey data on individuals voting behaviour. Information 
on the religion of candidates has been coded by the name of the candidate on the ballot and 
cross-checked with online and printed press material, collected through fieldwork 
conducted in Uttar Pradesh before, during and after the election. Where additional 
information has been required, interviews have been conducted with local party officers, 
local political observers and some of the candidates themselves.  
 The individual-level data on voters come from the Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election 
Survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi. A total 
of 7291 persons randomly selected from the latest electoral rolls were interviewed, from 
the second week of February 2012 till the first week of March (after polling but before 
counting of votes) in 399 locations in 101 constituencies spread across the state. The 
Assembly Constituencies and four polling booths within each sampled constituency were 
selected using Systematic Random Sampling. The social profile of the respondents 
interviewed largely matched the demographic profile of the state, except for women. The 
sample of respondents included 21% Dalits, 17% Muslims, 82% rural voters and 40% women 
respondents. The interviews were conducted by specially trained field investigators. The 
respondents were interviewed face-to-face at their home, preferably alone. The voting 
question was asked using a dummy ballot paper and dummy ballot box. 
Data for constituency-level characteristics include electoral results from the Election 
Commission of India, constituency census data, and the reservation status of the seat. All 
seats reserved for Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe candidates have been dropped from 
the analysis. To measure the political incentives that may moderate the influence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Muslim population variable in constituencies with a Muslim candidate is therefore much the same to the 
overall variation of the variable.  
candidate religion on voting behaviour we compute each party’s Distance from Contention 
(for third and lower placed parties this is the difference between the 2012 share of the vote 
for the party and that for the second placed party, and 0 if the party came first or second in 
the constituency). This serves as a proxy for the local strength of the different parties, and 
distinguishes between those parties which voters might reasonably expect to have a 
realistic chance of winning (those which come first or second) and those parties which are 
less competitive (see also Fisher et al 2014).2 Candidates who come third or lower may 
therefore be strategically abandoned and considered irrelevant.  Summary data on the 
performance of the parties is presented in the Appendix. To measure the social incentives 
we control for Muslim population density in the constituency, derived from 2001 Census 
estimates and linked to Assembly Constituencies by the CSDS. 
The impact of Candidate Religion on voting behaviour 
The first task is simply to examine the association between caste community and support 
for Muslim candidates in the 2012 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections.  Table 2 reports the 
percentage of voters from different ethnic backgrounds who voted for a Muslim candidate. 
There is some prima facie evidence to suggest that Muslims are somewhat more likely to 
vote for Muslim candidates than other communities. Overall 25% of Muslims voted for a 
Muslim candidate (from whatever party), compared to just 18% of Upper castes, 19% of 
Yadavs and 20% of Jatavs. To a certain extent these differences may reflect existing patterns 
                                                          
2 Ideally we would like to include some measure of party weakness prior to the elections, but no such data is 
available. Given the high level of electoral volatility in Indian elections, lagged data from the previous election 
is not a valid indicator (further compounded by the redrawing of constituency boundaries). That said, even if 
our measure is not perfect we still believe that it serves as a valid proxy for a number of reasons. The local 
constituency campaign is incredibly important in the Indian context and consequently voters at the local level 
also have a pretty good idea about which parties are most active and which parties are attracting the most 
support. Data from the 2012 survey shows that 75% of the electorate were contacted face to face by a party 
worker coming to their house during the campaign. In addition 32% attended an election meeting and 28% 
participated in a rally. Voters thus have a high degree of exposure to the campaign and this exposure means 
that they have a reasonable basis from which to evaluate which candidates are competitive and which are not. 
In a separate survey (from the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, data made available by the CSDS on request) a 
question asked respondents which party they thought was most likely to win in their parliamentary 
constituency. The modal response at the constituency level was correct in 75% of the cases. This indicates that 
the average voter had a reasonably good idea of who would win. However, it should be noted that our 
measure of DFC treats the top two candidates equally. Whereas voters might struggle to predict the actual 
winner in a close contest, they should find it much easier to identify who is competitive and who is not. The 
DFC is thus based on more realistic assumptions about voter expectations than, for example, a measure of 
marginality.  
of party support, since for example, upper castes are more likely than other communities to 
vote for the BJP, which put forward just one Muslim candidate.  
Table 2:  Support for Muslim candidates by Caste  
In order to test the link between candidate religion and voting behavior more systematically 
we must consider how the choice of candidate is influenced by the alternatives on offer and 
how this choice is moderated by social and political factors. There are a number of 
challenges involved in estimating the effect of candidate traits on voting behaviour in multi -
candidate elections, which make common econometric choice models, such as multinomial 
logit, inadvisable (see Alvarez and Nagler 1998). One solution is the conditional logit model, 
which is “conditional on the characteristics of the choices” (Alvarez and Nagler 1998: 56) 
and so takes into account measures of candidate characteristics. In order to estimate the 
effects of candidate religion on voting behaviour we therefore specify a conditional logit 
model (Long and Freese, 2005). The model uses stacked data, with four rows for each 
respondent, one for each party. The model allows case specific and alternative specific 
variables as predictors. This enables a single coefficient for the effects of candidate religion, 
or co-religion, to be estimated regardless of the candidate’s party.  In formal terms the 
model can be specified: 
               
               
      
 
             
 
Where zip contains values of the alternative specific variables for alternative p and case i. In 
our model there are four alternatives for party p: SP, BSP, Congress and BJP. Then ϒ is a 
parameter indicating the effect of the alternative specific variables on the probability of 
voting for one party over another. In general, for each variable zk, there are J values of the 
variable for each case, but only the single parameter ϒk. This enables a single coefficient for 
the effects of candidate religion to be estimated regardless of the candidate’s party. We also 
tested for evidence of variation in these coefficients across parties. As in a multinomial logit 
model,    contains case specific independent variables for case i, and    contains 
coefficients for the effects on alternative p relative to the base alternative (SP). See Long 
and Freese (2005) for more details. 
 To capture political incentives we control for Distance from Contention (for third and 
lower placed parties this is the difference between the 2012 share of the vote for the party 
and that for the second placed party, and 0 if the party came first or second in the 
constituency). This is alternative-specific and so the values vary across the party options for 
a given respondent. To capture social incentives we control for Muslim population density in 
the constituency. This is case-specific and so three coefficients are estimated (BSP*Muslim 
population, BJP*Muslim population and INC*Muslim population), for the effects on voting 
BSP, BJP and INC respectively, each relative to the baseline SP (just as a regular multinomial 
logit/probit model would have three such coefficients). 
 Table 3 shows the coefficients from two conditional logit models of vote choice for 
Hindus and Muslims who voted for the SP, BSP, INC and BJP. Model 1 shows that the effect 
of Muslim candidature on Hindu voters and Model 2 shows the effect on Muslim voters. The 
first thing to notice is that for both Hindu and Muslim voters there is a strong strategic 
element to the vote calculus. The distance from contention term is significant and negative, 
indicating that voters from both communities are less likely to support a party when that 
party does not stand a good chance of winning (see also Chandra 2009, Choi 2009). There is 
also some evidence that party support varies by the size of the Muslim population in the 
constituency. Hindu voters are somewhat more likely to vote for the BSP than the SP in high 
density Muslim areas, and Muslim voters are somewhat less likely to vote for the BSP and 
somewhat more likely to vote for Congress than they are to vote for the SP in high density 
Muslim areas. For both Hindus and Muslims support for the BJP does not vary by the size of 
the Muslim population. 
 Turning to the impact of candidate religion, we can see from Model 1 that there is no 
significant impact on Hindu voters. Hindus are neither more or less likely to vote for a party 
if that party puts forward a Muslim candidate. This goes against the ethnic penalty 
hypothesis, and perhaps validates the decision of the SP and BSP to put forward many 
Muslim candidates. Fears about a Hindu backlash against such a strategy are therefore 
somewhat misplaced. Unlike Britain, where Muslim candidates are discriminated against at 
the ballot box or the USA, where black candidates are discriminated against, in India there 
appears to be little evidence of any ethnic penalty for Muslim candidates. Given the historic 
communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims this is perhaps surprising. It may be that 
the Hindus who are prejudiced against Muslims self-select towards the BJP - or it may be 
that whatever prejudice exists among the supporters of the three secular parties, it is not 
enough to put them off voting for their preferred party when it has a realistic chance of 
winning.  
 By contrast Model 2 indicates that Muslim voters are significantly more likely to vote 
for Muslim candidates. When we take into account the size of the Muslim population in the 
constituency and how competitive the party is locally, Muslims are more likely to support 
that party if it puts forward a Muslim candidate. This supports the social representation 
hypothesis. Muslims in Uttar Pradesh may lack institutional representation through the 
reservation system or a party that explicitly stands up for their interests, like the Dalits have 
with the BSP, but by voting for Muslim candidates they increase the chances of getting 
Muslim voices in parliament.  
Table 3  Conditional logit models of party vote choice  
We can get a broad impression of the magnitude of the effect of Muslim candidates on 
Muslim voters by generating marginal effects on the predicted probabilities from Model 2 in 
Table 3. Marginal effects (differences in predicted probabilities) from that model are 
presented for different scenarios in Table 4. The first row shows the predicted probabilities 
from the model of voting for each party for a Muslim in a constituency with no Muslim 
candidates, where the other variables are set at their means (i.e. average distance from 
contention and Muslim population). The bottom three rows of Table 4 show how the 
baseline probabilities would change if each party were alone in fielding a Muslim candidate 
(apart from for the BJP where such a simulation would be meaningless). They show that the 
chances of voting for the party would increase by between 7.4 and 10.5 percentage points. 
The differences in the effects for the different parties are largely a function of the baseline 
probabilities and nothing should be inferred from them since the model has just one 
parameter for the effect of Muslim candidature on the log odds scale, which is the same for 
all parties. Similarly the estimated effects on the probability scale vary with different values 
of the control variables, so the figures in Table 4 are intended to be indicative not definitive. 
Broadly though, this simulation does suggest that the average effect of Muslim candidature 
is substantial, and in a competitive constituency with a large Muslim population, could be 
the difference between winning and losing. 
Table 4  Marginal effects on voting probabilities of Muslims in response to Muslim
  candidature  
Table 5 considers the strategic incentives that may act as potential moderating factors. First, 
we do not find any evidence to suggest that the effect of Muslim candidature on Muslim 
voters depends upon the ethnic composition of the constituency. Unlike Carsey (1995) or 
Avery and Fine (2012), though in line with Fisher et al (2014) we found no tendency for the 
effect of minority candidature to depend on the ethnic composition of the constituency, nor 
for the Muslim candidate effect to be stronger where there is a greater proportion of 
Muslims. Similarly we do not find any evidence that the effect of Muslim candidature on 
Hindus varies by ethnic composition. This (null) finding goes against the racial threat 
hypothesis, and suggests that in the Indian context Hindus do not discriminate against 
Muslim candidates, even where Muslims constitute a sizeable group.   
 The relative size of the Muslim population within the electorate may inform party 
strategy in terms of whether or not to put forward a Muslim candidate, but appears to have 
little effect on how Hindu or Muslim voters respond to such a candidate. Nonetheless, g iven 
the ethnic advantage that Muslim candidates receive from Muslim voters, and the absence 
of any backlash or ethnic penalty from Hindu voters, putting forward a Muslim candidate in 
an area with many Muslims would appear to offer a party a competitive advantage. 
 The second moderating factor tests the hypothesis that the effect of Muslim 
candidature depends upon the closeness of the race. We do not find any strategic effects on 
Hindus, but we do find significant effects on Muslims. Model 4 indicates that Muslim are  
significantly more likely to vote for Muslim candidates when the candidate in question has a 
realistic chance of winning.  Importantly, the impact of Muslim candidature varies by the 
competitiveness of the party at the constituency level. Muslims will not vote for a party 
simply because it has a Muslim candidate, but rather - when a party has a realistic chance of 
winning  - the candidate’s religion can act as an important tie-breaker. However, Muslims 
will not risk compromising on their preferred party by wasting their vote on a co-ethnic 
candidate that has little chance of winning. This provides further support to the social 
representation hypothesis, and suggests that Muslims behave in quite a Downsian way, 
taking into account both the marginal utility of having a representative from one community 
rather than another, and the probability of success of that candidate winning.  
Generating marginal effects of interaction terms in non-linear models is not straightforward.  
An alternative, and perhaps more meaningful approach, is to exponentiate the coefficients 
and interpret the interaction in terms of the natural metric of the model (Buis 2010). For 
conditional logit models these are the odds ratios. The odds ratio for Muslim candidature is 
1.703, which means that the odds of a Muslim voting for a party is 1.703 times greater when 
the party puts forward a Muslim candidate than when it puts forward a Hindu candidate.  
Since there is an interaction effect between Muslim candidature and distance from 
contention, this effect of Muslim candidature refers to candidates who come first or second 
in the constituency (that is those candidates who scored zero on the DFC term). The 
magnitude of this effect is quite substantial. Within this category we expect to find five 
Muslims voting for a party when it puts forward a Muslim candidate for every three Muslims 
voting for that party when it puts forward a Hindu candidate. 
The interaction effect tells us by how much the effect of Muslim candidature on vote choice 
differs by distance from contention, but does so in multiplicative terms. The results also 
show that this interaction is significant. The odds ratio for the interaction term is 0.961 
which means that the odds of voting for a party if it puts forward a Muslim candidate is 
0.961 times lower for every point increase on the distance from contention term. Since 
positive effects are greater than one and negative effects are between zero and one, we can 
compare the magnitudes of positive and negative effects by taking the inverse of the 
negative effect (or vice versa). For example, the positive factor change of 1.70 for 
competitive Muslim candidates has the same magnitude as a negative factor change of 
0.59=1/1.70 for uncompetitive Muslim candidates when DFC=13 (0.96113=0.596). This 
indicates that for a candidate who trails the second placed candidate by a noticeable 
amount (when DFC equals 13 percentage points) the odds of a Muslim voting for the party if 
it puts forward a Muslim candidate are about the same as when it puts forward a Hindu 
candidate. Thus whatever gains are made by putting forward a Muslim are lost when the 
candidate trails the top two by around 13 percentage points. In practical terms, this means 
that although Muslims may still be more likely to vote for a third placed party when it puts 
forward a Muslim candidate, they are probably only likely to do so when it is difficult to 
distinguish between the second and third placed candidates (and so the DFC terms is small).  
 We also investigated whether the propensity to vote for a Muslim candidate varied 
according to the local strength of different political parties. In particular, when the BJP is 
strong, Muslims may be less likely to compromise on their preferred party by voting for a 
Muslim candidate and risk letting the BJP win. However, we do not find any evidence of this 
over and above the strategic incentives already considered.  
Table 5  Conditional logit models of party vote choice with moderating variables  
Conclusions 
To summarize, Muslim voters are more likely to vote for Muslim candidates, generating an 
average electoral gain for Muslim candidates in the order of seven to eleven percentage 
points, and more in close contests. Where the Muslim population is sizeable, this gain could 
be the difference between winning and losing. Moreover, there is little evidence that 
fielding a Muslim candidate generates a backlash among Hindu voters (though there may 
well be differences between different sections of the Hindu community). There is thus little 
to suggest that Muslim candidates face an electoral penalty, and if anything, they have an 
electoral advantage in areas with high Muslim populations since they appear to gain votes 
from Muslim voters without any apparent loss of support among Hindu voters.  
 These findings have important implications for minority representation.  Muslims in 
India are amongst the most disadvantaged groups in society. They lack formal institutional 
political representation through the reservation system and do not have a distinctive 
‘Muslim’ party that represents their interests. The only way that Muslims can gain political 
representation then is by gaining leverage within existing political parties from within. There 
are thus high stakes attached to descriptive representation. In this sense the elections in 
2012 represent something of a watershed. For the first time Muslim MLAs achieved near 
proportional representation in the Uttar Pradesh State Assembly. We suggest that the 
reasons for this are three-fold: Firstly, Muslims are strategic in the circumstances under 
which they will vote for a co-ethnic candidate. The effect of co-religiosity matters much 
more in tight contests than it does in less competitive contests. There is thus less risk of 
wasting or splitting votes on a non-competitive candidate, which could in turn let in a less 
preferred political party. Secondly, there is no evidence of a backlash among Hindus to 
Muslim candidates. Even in constituencies with high Muslim populations or in areas where 
the BJP is strong and the idiom of Hindutva might be thought to be culturally entrenched, 
Muslim candidates do not appear to suffer any ethnic penalty. These two factors mean that 
there is little political risk, and potentially a substantial political advantage, for ‘secular’ 
parties such as the SP, BSP and Congress to put forward a Muslim candidate, particularly in 
constituencies where Muslims constitute a substantial size of the electorate. There are thus 
strong electoral incentives to increase the supply of Muslim candidates, which in turn makes 
the election of such candidates more likely. 
 These findings have implications for theories of ethnic voting and support for co-
ethnic candidates more generally. Rather than being a purely expressive act, as theories 
based on social identity imply, the results of our analysis show that Muslims in India behave 
in quite a Downsian way, taking into account the probability of success that a candidate 
from their own community will win. The extent to which this leads to tangible outcomes, 
however, depends in large part on the political context, and Muslim co-ordination may not 
always be enough to ensure Muslim representation. Indeed, the parliamentary elections of 
2014 saw the BJP sweep the polls, winning 71 out of the 80 seats in Uttar Pradesh, and 
consequently no Muslim MPs were elected to office. Co-ordination does not therefore 
guarantee representation in the same way as more formal institutional arrangements based 
on quotas or reservation. But what co-ordination does achieve is to maximize the chances of 
electoral success for Muslim candidates in an open competition. The ways in which Muslims 
have achieved this level of co-ordination – and particularly the role that local Mosques and 
Immans play in mobilising and co-ordinating voters, may then provide important lessons for 
how to help boost minority representation in other contexts, both across India and beyond.  
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Table 1: Religion of party candidates (2012 State Election) 
 BSP SP Congress BJP 
Muslim 
candidates 
88 
(21.9) 
83 
(20.8) 
20 
(6.4) 
1 
(0.3) 
Muslims elected 15 
(18.8) 
43 
(19.4) 
3 
(12.0) 
0 
 
Muslims runner-
up 
38 
(42.2) 
13 
(16.7) 
3 
(11.5) 
0 
Source: Uttar Pradesh State Assembly Legislators’ data set. 
  
Table 2:  Support for Muslim candidates by Caste  
 
Caste Voted for a Muslim 
candidate (%) 
N 
Upper caste 18 1436 
Yadav 19 769 
OBC 17 1191 
Jatav 20 738 
SC 19 546 
Muslim 25 1015 
Other 15 102 
 
  
Table 3  Conditional logit models of party vote choice  
 Model 1: Hindus 
only 
Model 2: Muslims 
only 
Party (baseline=SP)   
  BSP -0.407*** 
(0.071) 
-0.426* 
(0.173) 
  BJP -0.491*** 
(0.101) 
-1.481*** 
(0.282) 
  INC -0.617*** 
(0.104) 
-1.058*** 
(0.206) 
Distance from contention -0.034*** 
(0.003) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
Muslim population*BSP 0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
Muslim population*BJP -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
Muslim population*INC 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
Muslim candidate 0.016 
(0.060) 
0.434*** 
(0.131) 
Log Likelihood -4537 -900 
Notes:  *** p<0.005; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Models 1 contains 14090 observations and Model 
2 contains 3232 observations.  
 
  
Table 4  Marginal effects on voting probabilities of Muslims in response to Muslim
  candidature  
 
 SP BSP BJP INC 
     
Baseline voting probabilities (no 
Muslim candidates): 
52.2 18.4 6.6 22.7 
     
Change in probability if:     
SP Muslim, other candidates not 
Muslim 
+10.5 -4.1 -1.4 -0.5 
BSP Muslim, other candidates not 
Muslim 
-4.7 +7.4 -0.6 -2.1 
INC Muslim, other candidates not 
Muslim 
-5.7 -2.0 -0.7 +8.4 
     
Note: Change figures are percentage points. Simulations from Model (2) in Table 3. See text 
for more details. 
 
Table 5  Conditional logit models of party vote choice with moderating variables  
 Model 1: 
Hindus  
Model 2: 
Hindus 
Model 3: 
Muslims  
Model 4: 
Muslims  
Party (baseline=SP)     
  BSP -0.406*** 
(0.072) 
-0.406*** 
(0.071) 
-0.410* 
(0.173) 
-0.371* 
(0.174) 
  BJP -0.495*** 
(0.103) 
-0.480*** 
(0.101) 
-1.545*** 
(0.292) 
-1.514*** 
(0.282) 
  INC -0.620*** 
(0.106) 
-0.608*** 
(0.105) 
-1.116*** 
(0.216) 
-1.086*** 
(0.206) 
Distance from contention -0.034*** 
(0.003) 
-0.035*** 
(0.003) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.032*** 
(0.007) 
Muslim candidate -0.009 
(0.136) 
-0.002 
(0.136) 
0.133 
(0.331) 
0.532*** 
(0.331) 
Muslim population*BSP 0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
Muslim population*BJP -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
Muslim population*INC 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
Muslim candidate*Muslim 
population 
0.001 
(0.004) 
- 0.010 
(0.010) 
- 
Muslim 
candidate*Contention 
- 0.008 
(0.009) 
- -0.040* 
(0.016) 
Log Likelihood -4537 -4536 -900 -897 
Notes:  *** p<0.005; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Model 1 contains 14090 observations Model 2 
contains 3232 observations. 
 
Appendix A: Performance of parties (2012 State Election) 
 BSP SP Congress BJP 
No. of 
candidates 
387 394 347 383 
Winners 80 224 28 47 
Runners up 205 76 31 54 
Mean vote 
share 
25.7 29.3 13.1 15.2 
DFC  
  Mean 
  Std. Dev 
  Median 
  3rd quartile 
 
2.06 
4.90 
0 
23.25 
 
2.26 
5.85 
0 
28.31 
 
13.99 
10.3 
13.80 
34.54 
 
12.49 
11.37 
11.48 
36.6 
Source: Uttar Pradesh State Assembly Legislators’ data set. 
 
 
 
